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I. INTRODUCTION
You can get further with a kind word and a gun than you can
with just a kind word.1

The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause decisions of the last two
decades lack the consistency necessary to guide lower courts on the
extent of the congressional commerce power to regulate products that
remain intrastate. The current jurisprudence is muddled, and district
courts have been inconsistent in this application of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.2 The perpetual battle between the Congress
1

THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 423 (2009). See also, Jennifer A. Maier, Comment, Outgrowing
the Commerce Clause: Finding Endangered Species a Home in the Constitutional
Framework, 36 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 489, 506 (2006) (“Lopez and Morrison provided
2
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and the states has escalated, with the former claiming authority to
regulate behavior on a national level, and the latter declaring
independence under the Tenth Amendment. What at first looked like a
coup by the Rehnquist Court to reestablish strong federalism instead led
to a more invasive federal government and less power for the judiciary to
review congressional authority.3 Even with significant scholarship
begging for clarity4 and continued challenges in this new commerce
power regime,5 the Supreme Court has not remedied the situation.
The federal government now faces a challenge to the Commerce
Clause6 that packs more firepower than most. The Montana Firearms
Freedom Act (MFFA),7 “declares that any firearms made and retained instate are beyond the authority of Congress under its constitutional power
to regulate commerce among the states.”8 Montana asserts its Tenth
Amendment powers to regulate intrastate commerce and challenges the
federal government’s right to regulate the intrastate manufacture and
possession of firearms.9 A lawsuit currently in federal court requests a
declaratory judgment stating that Congress has no power to regulate guns
manufactured and distributed in accordance with the MFFA.10 As of
publication, seven other states have passed similar legislation.11
little guidance on how to define the term, ‘economic,’ which has led to the arbitrary
distinctions in Raich and will continue to cause confusion and inconsistency in Court
opinions until the ambiguity is resolved.”); Amanda M. Jones, Gonzales v. Raich: How
the Medical Marijuana Debate Invoked Commerce Clause Confusion, 28 HAWAII L. REV.
261, 287 (2005) (“Because Raich and Lopez seem indistinguishable using Morrison’s
four-factor test, confusion is inevitable.”); Kenton J. Skarin, Not All Violence is
Commerce: Noneconomic, Violent Criminal Activity, RICO, and Limitations on Congress
Under the Post Raich Commerce Clause, 13 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 187, 190 (2009)
(“However, the Court’s next major Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich,
created serious confusion among both lower courts and commentators as to the current
state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”).
3
Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2006); see generally, John W. Moorman, Note,
Conflicting Commerce Clauses: How Raich and American Trucking Dishonor Their
Doctrines, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 687 (2007).
4
See generally supra note 2.
5
E.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. . . .”).
7
Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010).
8
The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) is Sweeping the Nation., FIREARMS FREEDOM
ACT (June 3, 2010), http://firearmsfreedomact.com.
9
Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010).
10
Notice of Appeal, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-MDWM-JCL (D. Mont. Filed Dec. 2, 2010).
11
Tennessee Firearms Freedom Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §4-54-101 (2010); Alaska
Firearms Freedom Act, ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3114
(LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3315A (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-352 (2010); Utah State-Made Firearms Protection Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5b-
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The MFFA is not merely the work of the pro-gun lobby, nor is it an
issue that is isolated to a few states. The MFFA is a larger movement—a
deliberate effort to challenge congressional authority.12 Although this
statute relates to firearms, any challenge to Congress’s commerce power
can have far-reaching consequences in the way the federal government
operates and interacts with the states. Litigation surrounding the MFFA
could either severely limit the commerce power or affirm the force with
which Congress currently wields that power.
Following United States v. Lopez,13 circuit courts have evaluated
federal statutes invoking the Commerce Clause by placing them into one
of the three categories that Congress may regulate under the guise of
interstate commerce.14 This Comment uncovers a fourth category that
federal courts have yet to clearly articulate or recognize. This unspoken
category has been reserved for intrastate products — tangible objects that
Congress is attempting to regulate — as opposed to intrastate activities.
Evidence for this fourth category can be found by carefully reviewing the
seminal Commerce Clause cases and analyzing recent decisions in the
circuit courts.
This Comment proposes, first, that the product-based analysis
already exists and second, that it must now be expressly stated, with a
clearly articulated test, in order to properly adjudicate cases when the
regulation in question relates to a product that has not traveled in
interstate commerce. The inconsistent outcomes of cases that involve
intrastate products can be explained by looking to the subject of the case.
Medical marijuana, violence against women, wheat, and sex offender
registries are very different from one another and thus, have been treated
differently by courts, even though all have been unreasonably placed in
the same Lopez category. Few commentators have been willing to read
between the lines and recognize the underlying issues involved in
products cases, including the possibility of personal and societal biases
based on the object in Congress’s crosshairs.15 It is time for current
101 (LexisNexis 2010); Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-401
(2010).
12
See e.g. Barak Y. Orbach et. al., Arming States' Rights: Federalism, Private
Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161 (Winter 2010).
Orbach posits that the MFFA is a key use of what he calls the “Commerce Battering
Ram” to strengthen states’ rights. Id. at 1164. The “Commerce Battering Ram” is “a
political-legal apparatus that private lawmakers design and employ to challenge current
Commerce Clause jurisprudence” and primarily invokes the Tenth Amendment. Id.
13
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14
See infra Part II.
15
E.g., Lyle Dennison, Justice Kennedy and the “War on Drugs,” SCOTUSBLOG
(June 6, 2005), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/06/commentary-justice-kennedy-andthe-war-on-drugs (suggesting that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has a “zero tolerance
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jurisprudence to acknowledge those concerns and to fill the gap left by
the three Lopez categories, even if it is at “gunpoint.”
Section II presents a historical review of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in Commerce Clause cases as well as a showing of the
confusion among the circuit courts in trying to apply Raich in federal sex
offender registry law.16 In Section III, this Comment considers the
MFFA, the motivation and goals of its supporters, and the current court
challenges to the legislation. Section IV identifies the products category
of the Commerce Clause, suggesting a balancing test that requires
consideration of four factors. The balancing test takes into consideration
scattered elements of federal courts’ previous analyses. Section V
considers the viability of the MFFA under this new regime and shows
how the MFFA is likely to be insulated from regulation by the federal
government. It also examines other products to show that the category
has always existed, but until now, has not been articulated.
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. A Limited Congressional Power Grows
In Gibbons v. Ogden,17 the first Commerce Clause case, the
Supreme Court stated that “traffic” and “intercourse” that take place
beyond state borders is within congressional jurisdiction.18 This power
to regulate had inherent limitations because the “exclusively internal
commerce of a State” is not an enumerated power of Congress.19 In the
wake of the American Civil War, which was, at its core, a debate on
states’ rights, the Reconstruction Amendments20 ushered in the theory
that the federal government had responsibility for enforcing civil rights
for all citizens.21 The Supreme Court’s decision in The Civil Rights

point of view” when it comes to illegal drugs and that in Raich, Justice Kennedy
abandoned his more consistent legal position of favoring state powers over an expanding
role of the federal government).
16
See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008) cert granted sub nom.
Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (2009).
17
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
18
Id. at 189–95.
19
Id. at 194–95.
20
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
21
Rebecca E. Zietlow, John Bingham and the Meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 718 (2003) (“After the Civil War, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Reconstruction era, civil rights statutes reflect the fact that the
Thirty-ninth Congress adopted an expansive vision of the rights of federal citizens and
that Congress embraced its role as protector of those rights.”).
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Cases of 1883,22 however, was a major defeat for the Reconstruction
Amendments and the federal legislation that Congressional Republicans
passed to enforce the spirit of those constitutional changes. The Supreme
Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and declined to extend
the statute’s anti-discrimination and equal protection provisions to
private actors, but rather extended the provisions only to the states.23
The Court suggested, however, that federal discrimination laws could be
sustained under the Commerce Clause.24 This planted the seed for
federal anti-discrimination law in the next century.25
The Court directly addressed Congress’s commerce power as the
20th century approached. The Lottery Case26 established that Congress
could not use the Anti-Lottery Act of 1895 to outlaw all lottery tickets;
rather, the act could only outlaw those that traveled in interstate
commerce. This holding was based on the proposition that it is within
the federal government’s reach to regulate what “evils” are permitted on
the channels of interstate commerce.27
This same reasoning applied to the Court’s decisions in Hoke v.
United States28 and Caminetti v. United States,29 which upheld the White
Slave Traffic (Mann) Act30 as a constitutional use of the Commerce
Clause to control what products or people are permitted in interstate
channels.31 Congress had a well-defined, but limited, power over
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, did not allow the
22

United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Stanley, 109 U.S. at 18–20.
24
Id. at 18–19 (“Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which
Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject,
accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the
regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post offices and post reads, the
declaring of war, etc. In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the
subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in
respect thereof . . . . And whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate
commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law regulating rights in
public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also a question which is not now
before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in any such view.”).
25
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (“Thus the
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate
the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.”).
26
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
27
Id. at 362.
28
227 U.S. 308 (1913).
29
242 U.S. 470 (1917).
30
White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (current version at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)).
31
Id.
23
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federal government to regulate the same “evils” that did not cross state
lines.
Until 1937, the Supreme Court had significantly curtailed the power
of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause if the Court
considered a law to have more local than interstate characteristics.32
Early in Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the Court rebuffed Roosevelt’s
“New Deal” agenda, finding his initiatives to be beyond the scope of
congressional commerce power.33 But the Court eventually agreed with
the administration and Congress in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.34 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) mandated that
workers be permitted to unionize and participate in collective bargaining
and that the NLRB could issue a complaint against any company
operating with “unfair labor practices” that were “affecting commerce.”35
The Court stated, “[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character
when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.”36
Armed with the newly-expanded reading of the Commerce Clause,
Congress continued to pass laws invoking their commerce power for the
next sixty years.37 This expansion did not go uncontested. Ohio farmer
Roscoe Filburn filed suit against the government after he was penalized
for harvesting too much wheat pursuant to the statutory maximum in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).38 The AAA had a basis in
rudimentary economics: the lesser the supply of wheat on the market, the
higher the price would rise, which would, in turn, encourage wheat
production. 39 In Wickard v. Filburn, Filburn argued that his excess
wheat was for his own consumption, and so long as his product did not
enter the national market, it could not directly affect interstate commerce
and could not come under Congress’s commerce power.40
32

Gregory W. Watts, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of “Economic”
Proportions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 545, 548 (2007).
33
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US
238 (1936); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (The Hot Oil Case), 293 U.S. 388 (1935); R.R.
Ret. Bd. v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
34
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35
Id. at 22–25.
36
Id. at 37.
37
John M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection of RFRA: Integrating Lopez and
Boerne, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 767, 781 n.95 (1998).
38
See Jim Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1733–36 (2003).
39
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).
40
Id. at 119–20.
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The Supreme Court ruled that although Filburn’s individual
consumption had little effect on interstate commerce, if farmers in
aggregate acted in contravention of the statute, there would be a “far
from trivial” effect on demand for wheat.41 The Court upheld the AAA
and Congress’s absolute ability to control the market price of a
commodity in interstate commerce.42 “Filburn is regarded today as the
high-water mark of the New Deal’s constitutional revolution.”43
B. A Confusing Modern Era
Lopez v. United States proved to be the breaking point for
commerce power expansion. In 1992, a Texas high school student was
indicted and charged with a violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 (GFSZA).44 This federal law made it a crime to possess a
firearm in a school zone.45 The opinion in Lopez, written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, announced that it would define the “outer limits” of
Congress’s commerce power.46 The Rehnquist Court articulated three
broad categories of activities that Congress has the ability to regulate.47
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.48

The Court stated that the GFSZA would be evaluated under the
substantially affects category.49 The GFSZA parted from statutes such as
the AAA in that the latter related to an economic activity,50 whereas the
GFSZA concerned criminal penalties.51 The Court explained that when
41

Id. 127–28.
Id. at 127–29.
43
Chen, supra note 38, at 1747. See also, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560
(1995) (“Wickard . . . is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity. . . .”).
44
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
45
18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
46
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57.
47
Id. at 558.
48
Id. (citations omitted). The three categories, in order, are hereinafter alternatively
identified as the “channels category,” the “instrumentalities, persons, and things
category,” and the “substantially affects category.” Id.
49
Id. at 559.
50
Id. at 560.
51
18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A).
42
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Congress follows the “pattern” of economic activity cases, the Court will
uphold the statute.52 Therefore, the Supreme Court did not overrule
Jones & Laughlin Steel or Wickard.53 The Court declared instead that
the GFSZA did not relate to commerce or any type of economic activity,
and also lacked any jurisdictional element that would tie the concern to
interstate commerce.54 In response to Lopez, Congress amended
§ 922(q) and included findings that guns in and around schools affect
interstate commerce.55
Lopez was affirmed in United States v. Morrison.56 The Supreme
Court considered the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),57
which gave victims of gender-motivated violence a civil remedy against
their attackers.58 Looking again at the substantially affects category, the
Court discussed four “significant considerations” stated in Lopez.59 First,
the GFSZA was a criminal statute and it did not relate to commerce or
the economy.60 Second, the GFSZA had no jurisdictional element or
“explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”61 Third,
although not required, the statute contained no legislative history or
congressional findings on how instate commerce was affected by guns in
a school zone.62 Lastly, the Court did not see more than an attenuated
link between the possession of a firearm in a school zone and interstate
commerce.63
With these four factors established, the Court found that VAWA
satisfied only one factor, congressional findings, which the Court
declared as insufficient to uphold the act under Congress’s commerce
power.64 Furthermore, Congress came to these findings using reasoning

52

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Chen, supra note 38, at 1751 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
54
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
55
Id. at 563 n.4. The amended statute has not come before the Supreme Court, but it
has been upheld in the circuit courts. See also Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended GunFree School Zones Act: Doubt as to Its Constitutionality Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637
(2000).
56
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
57
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
58
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006) (“for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.”).
59
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
60
Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
61
Id. at 611–12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
62
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 614, 615.
53
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that the Court denied in Lopez.65 The Court rejected VAWA as outside
the scope of Congress’s power to regulate, given that violence against
women is a noneconomic crime, even if it has an aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.66 The Court further noted that it is a local activity,
and that “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local.”67
Gonzales v. Raich68 has replaced Lopez as the seminal commerce
power case, which was a surprising turn.69 The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) seized and destroyed cannabis plants grown by
the respondents, who legally possessed them under the California
Compassionate Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act encouraged the
affordable accessibility of marijuana to “seriously ill” patients and called
for exceptions for doctors, caretakers, and other individuals to prescribe,
cultivate, and possess marijuana.70 In order to justify seizure of the
plants, the DEA invoked the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which
makes possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana a federal
crime.71 Respondents sued for relief from the enforcement of the CSA,
arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.72 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, found the CSA to be constitutional.73 The Court recited
the history of the CSA and called the law a “comprehensive statute,”
which Congress passed to halt or control the international and interstate
trade of illicit drugs and controlled substances.74
The Court compared the “striking” similarities of the CSA and the
statute reviewed in Wickard, the AAA, finding that both regulated the
supply and demand of fungible commodities that Congress had a rational
basis to believe would affect interstate commerce.75 In order to
accomplish the goal of limiting the use and trade in controlled illicit
substances, Congress enacted the CSA, which the Court deemed

65

Id. at 615.
Id.
67
Id. at 617–18.
68
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
69
See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On
Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2101, 2103 (2006). “[T]he Raich principle is somewhat surprising in light of the
‘new federalism’ era marked by Lopez and Morrison.” (alterations added).
70
Raich, 545 U.S. at 6–8.
71
21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
72
Raich, 545 U.S. at 7–8. Respondents also claimed the enforcement of the CSA
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity. Id.
73
Id. at 9.
74
Id. at 10–15.
75
Id. at 17–22.
66
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“necessary and proper” to combat enforcement problems.76 The Court
further noted, “[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate
activity is of no moment.”77 The Court also distinguished the CSA as a
complex regulatory scheme and not a single-subject statute, in contrast to
the GFSZA.78 The complexity of the CSA supported the government’s
proposition that the restriction on marijuana could not be specifically
exempted.79
In rejecting the respondents’ claim that the Morrison decision
applied, the Court explained that neither VAWA nor the GFSZA
regulated economic activity.80 In contrast, the Court labeled the
provisions of the CSA “quintessentially economic,” and defined
“economics” as “the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities.”81
The Court noted, “[p]rohibiting the intrastate
possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and
commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.”82
The concept of supply and demand is such a basic concept that Congress
had the right to control commerce in the way the CSA permitted.83
The Court also rejected the claim that the California medicinal
marijuana supply could be cut off from the national supply.84 First, the
Court noted that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution85 settles all
conflicts in law in favor of the federal government.86 Second, the Court
recognized that “unscrupulous people” would have no issue in using the
California law to their devious advantage and would therefore be able to
move marijuana into the national marketplace.87 The Court fully
supported the CSA as falling within the bounds of Congress’s commerce
power.

76

Id. at 22 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
Id. at 22.
78
Raich, 545 U.S. at 23–24.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 25.
81
Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (3d ed.
1966)).
82
Id. at 26.
83
Id. at 28–29.
84
Raich, 545 U.S. at 29–32.
85
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
86
Raich, 545 U.S. at 29.
87
Id. at 31–32.
77
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C. Scarborough: The Outlier Within
Scarborough v. United States88 is mentioned only once in the
Lopez-Morrison-Raich line of cases, in dissent,89 but the case is relevant
to Commerce Clause jurisprudence when dealing with the regulation of
an intrastate product. Scarborough was convicted under the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for being a convicted felon
“who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting
commerce . . . any firearm . . . .”90 The defendant had been convicted of
a narcotics felony in 1972, and in 1973, law enforcement executed a
search warrant and found four firearms in his bedroom.91 He was
charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202.92 The government argued
that it need only prove that the weapons in his possession had traveled in
interstate commerce at some point,93 and the Supreme Court agreed,
ending a circuit split on the matter.94 After a discussion of statutory
construction and the legislative record, the Court concluded that
Congress intended no more than a “minimal nexus” between the firearm
and interstate commerce, meaning that the statute reached any firearm
that traveled in interstate commerce at any time.95 But the Court did not
say that this conviction could be upheld absent the interstate travel of the
firearm. In wording that foreshadowed the “regulatory scheme”
language of Raich, the Court held that the defendant’s theory that the
nexus between the possession of firearms and interstate commerce was
too attenuated would “create serious loopholes in the congressional plan
to ‘make it unlawful for a firearm . . . to be in the possession of a
convicted felon.’”96 Scarborough is noteworthy because it was not
overruled following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and
Morrison, and thus, remains good law.97
D. Federal Sex Offender Registries
One area that has yielded significant case law in post-Raich
jurisprudence, but has failed to contribute to further clarity of Raich, is
federal registration for sex offenders. The Sex Offender Registration and
88

431 U.S. 563 (1977).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.598, 658 (2000).
90
Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564.
91
Id. at 564–65.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 565.
94
Id. at 566–67.
95
Id. at 567–75.
96
Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575–76 (internal citations omitted).
97
Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or decision of
Scarborough.
89
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Notification Act (SORNA), part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, (the “Walsh Act”),98 requires sex offenders to
register in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which they reside, work, or
attend school.99 The federal law establishes the registration requirements
and dictates how long offenders must remain registered based on the
level of their offense.100 As a condition of some federal law enforcement
funding, states must have a registry that complies with federal
standards.101 A National Sex Offender Registry is maintained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.102
Nearly every challenge to SORNA on Commerce Clause grounds
in the circuit courts has favored the federal government, but the way in
which the courts have reached that conclusion has differed.103 Although
there is not a true circuit split in the final decisions in these cases, as they
have all found SORNA constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the
categorization of SORNA under the three Lopez categories has varied.104
98

42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2006).
United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2008); 42 U.S.C.
§ 16913 (2006).
100
42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2006). Tier I offenders must remain registered for 15 years;
Tier II offenders must remain registered for 25 years; and Tier III offenders must remain
registered for life. Offenders may be able to lower their required registration time based
on a clean record. Id.
101
42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2) (2006). Even if there is a Spending Power issue involved,
it would not reach the issue of a federal statute being used to enforce a state registry, even
if it was required by the federal government. Id.
102
42 U.S.C. § 16919(a) (2006).
103
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008) and
United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (2009) and the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
George, 579 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) held that SORNA is permitted under the first two
categories of Lopez. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (2009)
determined that the penalty provision is covered under the “channels of commerce”
category of Lopez and that the registration requirement falls into the substantially affects
category. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir.
2008) and United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008) and the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) placed both provisions
of SORNA into the “channels of commerce” category, or alternatively, the
“instrumentalities, persons, and things” category, explaining that the movement of sex
offenders is akin to the movement of people for “immoral purposes” as a permitted
regulation in Caminetti. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th
Cir. 2009) found that § 2250 of SORNA implicated the first two Lopez categories, and
that § 16913 was supported by the regulatory scheme of the Walsh Act, for which the
court cited extensive congressional findings on the effects that sex offenders traveling
interstate would have on interstate commerce. The Second Circuit in United States v.
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010) found that § 2250 is permissible under the first and
second Lopez categories, as it would not otherwise reach intrastate sex offenders, and that
although § 16913 “is more difficult” to determine, it is part of the Walsh Act’s larger
regulatory scheme that can be regulated under the Necessary and Proper Clause powers
of Congress.
104
See supra note 103.
99
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It appears, however, that the extensive circuit court work in this area is
moot because the Supreme Court has avoided the Commerce Clause
argument in these cases altogether.105
Despite the buildup at the circuit court level, the Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding SORNA prove that it was not meant to be a
watershed commerce clause statute. In Carr v. United States,106 the
Supreme Court determined that an individual who committed an
underlying sexual offense and traveled in interstate commerce prior to
SORNA’s enactment cannot be prosecuted under § 2250.107 It is likely
not a coincidence that Carr, on appeal from the Seventh Circuit’s case
United States v. Dixon, was the case that the Court chose to review. The
Seventh Circuit did not discuss the Commerce Clause implications of
SORNA, and the Supreme Court’s final decision reflected that.108 By
avoiding the Commerce Clause issues of SORNA, the Supreme Court
has done nothing to settle the inconsistencies that exist in the
jurisprudence.
III. THE MONTANA FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT
A. Statutory History
The Montana Firearms Freedom Act was signed by Governor Brian
D. Schweitzer and became effective on October 1, 2009, signaling the
start of the controversy.109 According to the MFFA, the Ninth110 and
Tenth Amendments111 to the Constitution preclude federal regulation of
purely intrastate manufacture of firearms, firearms accessories, and
ammunition.112 The MFFA invokes the Second Amendment, “as that
right was understood at the time that Montana was admitted to
statehood,” as a contractual bond with the federal government and the
state and people of Montana.113 The MFFA deems specific firearms
105
Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). But see Corey Rayburn Yung, When
is a Circuit Agreement Really a Circuit Split?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 10, 2009)
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/when_is_circuit.html (arguing that
there is actually a circuit split disguised as an agreement).
106
130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).
107
Id.
108
Id. Instead, the ruling was based on statutory interpretation. Id.
109
Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010).
110
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
111
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
112
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-102 (2010).
113
Id.
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exclusively intrastate, and thus not subject to any federal regulations. The
firearms that fall within the ambit of the statute are those with all of their
major parts, accessories, and ammunition manufactured in the state and
that have received a special permit requiring them to remain in
Montana.114 The legislature also declares that small, insignificant parts
and raw materials that may move in interstate commerce do not subject
the finished product to federal regulation.115 To market the firearm in
Montana, the weapon must have “Made in Montana” stamped on a major
metallic part.116 The MFFA also states that the statute will not protect
firearms that require more than one person to carry, firearms that have a
larger bore diameter and smokeless powder, ammunition that has an
exploding projectile using chemical energy, or automatic weapons.117
The actual effect of the legislation on the production of firearms in
Montana is unclear. There are only eight firearms manufacturers in
Montana,118 but business has been booming due to high demand.119
Whether that demand or the legislation increases the amount of in-state
manufacturers remains to be seen. At present, all individuals and
companies that manufacture firearms and ammunition, as well as those
who conduct interstate and intrastate sales, are required to have a federal
license and follow all federal regulations.120 Therefore, the MFFA
presents a significant divergence with the current law.
B. Federal Firearms Statutes
The MFFA targets federal firearms statutes. The 1934 National
Firearms Act (NFA) imposed taxes on the manufacture and sale of
firearms,121 and also provided for registration.122 The Gun Control Act of
1968 (GCA)123 intended to assist the states in regulating and controlling
the marketplace for firearms in order to enforce the states’ own gun

114

Id. at § 30-20-104.
Id.
116
Id. at § 30-20-106.
117
Id. at § 30-20-105.
118
Montana Firearms Manufacturers and Gunsmiths, MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.mtssa.org/mt.phtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
119
Myers Reece, Surrounded by Job Losses, Montana’s Firearms Industry Thrives,
FLATHEAD BEACON (Oct. 30, 2009) (available at http://www.newwest.net/city/article/
surrounded_by_job_losses_montanas_firearms_industry_thrives/C8/L8) (“And [in 2009,]
prompted by concern over how the Obama administration will affect federal gun laws,
business has gone through the roof.”).
120
18 U.S.C. § 923 (2006).
121
26 U.S.C. §§ 5811–22 (2006).
122
Id. at§ 5841.
123
18 U.S.C. §§ 921 (2006).
115
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control laws and help slow serious crime.124 The GCA also established a
list of prohibited acts,125 licensing,126 penalties,127 and concealed carry
regulations,128 among many other requirements.129 The federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) has the authority
to investigate violations of the NFA and the GCA.130
Federal firearms laws state that no one may be in “the business of
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or
manufacturing firearms ammunition” until they obtain a Federal
Firearms License (FFL).131 FFL holders can “ship, transport, or receive
any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.”132 FFL holders must also
maintain records for any business they conduct,133 though the types of
records differ depending on the type of license, i.e., manufacturing
versus importing.134 One such record is the Firearms Transaction
Record, BATF Form 4473, which FFL holders must complete.135 FFL
holders must verify the recipient’s identity and conduct a background
check with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.136
The GCA also requires that every firearm imported or manufactured
have a serial number permanently on the receiver or frame of the
firearm.137
C. The MFFA in Federal Court
When the MFFA went into effect on October 1, 2009, proponents
filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaration that the MFFA and the
activities that it authorizes are permissible notwithstanding current

124

S. Rep. No. 1866, 89th Cong., 2s Sess. 1 (1966). The three goals of the legislation
were to “(1) regulate more effectively interstate commerce in firearms so as to reduce the
likelihood that they fall into the hands of the lawless or those who might misuse them; (2)
assist the States and their political subdivisions to enforce their firearms control laws and
ordinances; and (3) help combat the skyrocketing increases in the incidence of serious
crime in the United States.” Id.
125
18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
126
Id. at § 923.
127
Id. at § 924.
128
Id. at § 926A–936C.
129
Id. at §§ 921–931.
130
28 U.S.C. § 599A (2006).
131
18 U.S.C. § 923 (2006).
132
Id. at § 922(a)(1)(A).
133
Id. at § 923(g)(1)(A).
134
27 C.F.R. §§ 478.121–25.
135
18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2006); 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124. The statute is also
known as BATF Form 4473. 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124.
136
18 U.S.C. § 922(t); 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124.
137
18 U.S.C. § 923(i) (2006).
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federal laws.138 The Montana Shooting Sports Association (MSSA),
along with its president Gary Marbut139 and the Second Amendment
Foundation (SAF) filed the complaint, which seeks to enjoin the federal
government from prosecuting Montana citizens for following the
MFFA.140 The plaintiffs have expressed their wishes to manufacture and
sell firearms and ammunition within the state without federal
registration.141 Marbut inquired directly to BATFE regarding the issue
and the agency told Marbut that he was required to register with them.142
The findings and recommendations by the magistrate judge,143
which were later accepted in full by the district court,144 make it clear
that the two sides are arguing very different cases. The MSSA argued
that the Constitution does not give Congress the power to regulate the
contemplated actions by Marbut, and that the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments should permit this intrastate regulation.145 The MSSA also
disputed the federal government’s argument that the Supremacy Clause
superseded any state claims in the area of firearms regulation.146
This argument regarding the Ninth and Tenth Amendments may
very well be colorable, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this
Comment.147 Some consider the Tenth Amendment an important part of
“New Federalism,”148 while others give it no more importance than “a
138
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
139
Officers, MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION, http://www.mtssa.org/
officers.phtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2010); Declan McCullagh, “Gun-Rights Groups Plan
State-by-State Revolt,” Political Hotsheet, CBS NEWS, (June 16, 2009) available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/06/16/politics/politicalhotsheet/
entry5090952.shtml.
140
Id. 3–4; 8–10.
141
Id. 5–6.
142
Id. 13–14.
143
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
144
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 110891 (D. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010).
145
MSSA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *9.
146
Id.
147
The premise of this Comment is that there may be an easier route through a betterarticulated categorization of the ways in which Congress can or cannot regulate based on
the Commerce Clause power. As will be discussed, infra, the United States argues that
the federal government’s power in this area derives from the Commerce Clause, and my
prediction is that this is the course that this suit, and others like it, will follow. Though
the Tenth Amendment argument may be a more popular, and populist, way of attacking
the issue, as has been done in the news media, the MFFA would need to defeat a
Commerce Clause claim first. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992);
Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir. 2007).
148
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in
the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007).
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truism with attitude.”149 It is more appropriate to consider the validity of
the MFFA under the Commerce Clause directly.150
After rejecting the MSSA’s claim on both sovereign immunity151
and standing,152 the magistrate judge addressed the Commerce Clause
issues. The court cited Raich and pointed out that “even purely local
activities” can be regulated by Congress when the activity falls under the
third Lopez category, as is the case with the MFFA.153 At the heart of the
ruling was a comparison between the CSA in Raich and the NFA and
GCA.154 The court refused to distinguish Raich from the case at bar.155
The court also looked to United States v. Stewart (Stewart II),156 the
relevant Ninth Circuit precedent, to lend support to its findings and
recommendations.157 The MSSA has filed for an appeal before the Ninth
Circuit.158
IV. IDENTIFYING THE PRODUCTS CATEGORY
A. The Need for an Articulated Fourth Category For Products
The substantially affects category of Lopez is over-inclusive and
must be narrowed in order to reach more coherent and consistent results.
Statutes such as VAWA, which the Supreme Court analyzed in
Morrison, and the NLRA, permitted under Jones & Laughlin Steel,
should continue to occupy this category. This “broad” category remains
relevant and coherent for intangibles, or as the Supreme Court has
VAWA included no aspect of
characterized them, activities.159
economics,160 but rather concerned the implementation of a civil remedy
for a violent crime.161 Yet the four factors of Morrison have applied too
broadly to cases involving products, both in interstate and intrastate
149

Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469 (2008).
150
See McCullagh, supra note 139.
151
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 104301, *15–29 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
152
Id. at *29–46.
153
Id. at *49.
154
Id. at *49–53.
155
Id. at *58–70.
156
451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
157
MSSA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *53–56. A more detailed review of
Stewart II follows infra Parts VI and V.
158
Notice of Appeal, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-MDWM-JCL (D. Mont. Filed Dec. 2, 2010).
159
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
160
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”).
161
Id. at 601.
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commerce. The Court’s decision in Lopez to place anything that is not
the use of a channel of interstate commerce or is not an instrumentality,
person, or thing in interstate commerce into this amorphous third
category of “activity” created several problems. This broad language
gives lower courts no substantial guidance, as almost anything can be
considered part of a larger activity and therefore may be regulated by
Congress.
The analysis of what activities are covered under Congress’s
commerce power is also muddled by different judicial preferences
regarding these varied policy goals of the regulations in question. In his
concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia considered his change of position
from his decisions in Lopez and Morrison not a reversal, but rather part
of a “nuanced” view of the Commerce Clause powers vested in the
federal government.162 Justice Scalia relied heavily on the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution163 as a supplement to the Commerce
Clause power. Others have seen Justice Scalia’s concurrence as his
justification for accomplishing a conservative policy goal.164 “Unlike in
Lopez and Morrison, which involved gun possession and violence
against women—two issues that [Justice] Scalia arguably did not want to
see nationalized—[Justice] Scalia saw a need for federal involvement in
regulating the availability of marijuana.”165
Confusion also arises because Scarborough has not been given its
proper place in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Although Lopez struck
down a related gun law, § 922(g) is still valid despite there being a
minimal nexus between gun possession and interstate commerce.166
162

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
164
JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 271
(2006). Staab characterized this as a more balanced approach to federalism that Justice
Scalia adopted beginning in the 1990s that shifted him from a “Hamiltonian” to a
“Madisonian.” Staab also considers the political reasons that Justice Scalia may have
used “Hamiltonian means . . . to accomplish conservative goals.” Id. This theory falls
short, however, when one considers Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34–36, in which Scalia found that there was an “unreasonable” search, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging to
find halide lights used to grow marijuana indoors.
165
Id. Justice Scalia was also skeptical of the premise of the suit and Raich’s goals in
the first place. Id. “Scalia did not likely approve of marijuana being described as
medical treatment, and was concerned about the Compassionate Use Act being misused
and marijuana becoming more prevalent in interstate commerce.” Id.
166
Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms, and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough
in Light of Lopez, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 671, 676–77 (2001).
163
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Some circuits have argued that logically, the concept of an interstate
nexus noted in Scarborough could not survive Lopez, but none of these
courts overruled the 1977 decision.167 Scarborough has been criticized
for creating the “legal fiction” that no matter how remote a gun’s
connection to interstate commerce may be, even if in the past, it could be
considered to be “in” commerce.168 Raich permitted Congress’s reach
into intrastate possession because the object regulated was subject to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. Scarborough addresses nothing
about markets or any commercially related activity whatsoever. In terms
of the Commerce Clause framework, the possession of guns in
Scarborough has no home in any Lopez category, yet it has not been
overturned in the face of these conflicts.
This amorphous substantially affects category has led to wheat
farmers, child pornographers, gun-toting felons, medicinal marijuana
growers, and labor unions all being regulated under the same
constitutional principle. For cases in which a product that remains in
intrastate commerce is the concern, a fourth category is appropriate.169
But, in case after case, the Court has been unable to divorce itself from
the Lopez framework and has indiscriminately dropped every irregular
issue into the third category as an “activity.”
Raich operated under this flaw, using “activity” to mean “product,”
as if the terms are interchangeable. The Court in Raich said, “Wickard
thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that
is not itself ‘commercial’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it
concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”170 A “purely
intrastate activity” cannot be “produced for sale.” Consider the root
word: a product is what is produced. The “evil” that Congress wants to
regulate is not that Filburn farmed, generally. Had Filburn planted
excessive acreage that yielded no wheat he would not have faced fines
under the AAA. His activity of growing is not the problem: his product,
wheat, is.

167

Id.
United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“This fiction
is indelible and lasts as long as the gun can shoot. Thus, a felon who has always kept his
father’s World War II trophy Luger in his bedroom has the weapon ‘in’ commerce.”).
169
For another reason to create a fourth category under the Lopez framework, see
Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impulses, Digital Signals, and Federal
Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First Century, 56
VAND. L. REV. 277, 320 (2003) (suggesting that a fourth category is necessary to analyze
the federal regulation of interstate communication devices).
170
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).
168
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Herein lies the flaw of Wickard and Raich. Both of the statutes in
question regulate products and their markets. Even if the product is
never sold, the economic laws of supply and demand justify the
congressional prerogative if the goal of the legislation is to control the
national market.171 Yet, that economic-based regulation is not always the
purpose of congressional action. The fourth category of products would
establish a test to determine if Congress can regulate an intrastate
product.
The circuit courts have been unable to avoid this confusion. In
United States v. Patton,172 the Tenth Circuit recognized that although
“[i]t may seem like common sense to prohibit felons’ possession of
bulletproof vests and other forms of body armor,” it does not necessarily
mean that Congress has the power to regulate that possession.173 The
Tenth Circuit’s dilemma is that it had to decide whether to make the
decision based on the three categories of Lopez or to utilize the
Scarborough standard.174 The bulletproof vest in question in Patton was
manufactured in another state but was possessed by the defendant only in
Kansas.175 Patton was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 931, which
prohibits the “purchase, ownership, or possession of body armor by
violent felons.”176
The court dismissed the channels category and the
instrumentalities, people, and things category as sources for
congressional authority.177 In order to evaluate the substantially affects
category, the court employed its own four-factor test outlined in United
States v. Grimmett.178 The Tenth Circuit explained that to decide if
Congress had a rational basis for believing the activity taken in aggregate
would substantially affect interstate commerce, the court must consider
whether:
(1) the activity at which the statute is directed is commercial or
economic in nature; (2) the statute contains an express
jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might
limit its reach; (3) Congress has made specific findings regarding
171
Whether or not this is a sound economic policy is an issue for another day.
Precedent allows for such a prerogative.
172
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006).
173
Id. at 618 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821)
(Marshall, C.J.) (“Congress has . . . no general right to punish murder committed within
any of the States.”)).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 619–20.
176
18 U.S.C. § 931 (2006).
177
Patton, 451 F.3d at 620–22.
178
439 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2006).
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the effects of the prohibited activity on interstate commerce; and
(4) the link between the prohibited conduct and a substantial
effect on interstate commerce is attenuated.179

First, the court found that the possession of body armor is not
commercial.180 Second, the Tenth Circuit posited that this law regulated
only specific possession, not the market itself, as required by Raich.181
The court also found that the government’s argument that there was a
link between crime and an effect on interstate commerce was
insufficient, akin to a mythical butterfly effect.182 Similar arguments had
already been rejected in Lopez and Morrison.183 Third, the Tenth Circuit
recognized that Congress mentioned the national market for body armor,
but also noted that the statute did nothing to limit that market in any
way.184 Despite findings to the contrary, the majority of states already
regulate the possession and use of body armor, so the federal regulations
may not even be necessary, and may actually impede upon the states’
local police powers, which they traditionally control.185 Fourth, the
definition of body armor in federal law was overbroad in that almost all
body armor would be regulated by it.186 Congress did not give reasons as
to why body armor that travels in interstate commerce and does not fall
into the possession of a felon should not be regulated, making it difficult
to find if that particular activity substantially affected interstate
commerce.187 The court thus found § 931 unconstitutional under this
framework.188
The Tenth Circuit then cautiously returned to Scarborough. The
court cited over a dozen opinions, in several circuits, in which the
validity of Scarborough was questioned in light of the current line of
commerce power cases.189 The court completely discounted the
regulatory scheme and other standards in Raich in reaching the
conclusion that § 931 is a constitutional use of Congress’s commerce
power.

179

Id. at 1272.
Patton, 451 F.3d at 625.
181
Id. at 626–28.
182
Id. at 628–29.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 630–31.
185
Id. at 631–32.
186
Patton, 451 F.3d at 633.
187
Id. at 633.
188
Id. at 633–34.
189
Id. at 634–35. See e.g., United States v. Kitsch, 307 F. Supp. 2d 657, 660–61
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (relying on Scarborough and circuit precedent for a ruling on § 922(g)).
180
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The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that there is “considerable
tension between Scarborough and the three-category approach,” but
“[a]ny doctrinal inconsistency between Scarborough and the Supreme
Court’s more recent decisions is not for this Court to remedy.”190
Though the circuits may not technically be split on some of these
matters, it is clear that they are, at best, pleading for clarification, and at
worst, challenging the Supreme Court to settle these divergent paths of
Commerce Clause analysis.
B. The Four Factor Test
The circuit courts have come to their conclusions on the regulation
of products in intrastate commerce based on disparate reasoning. Using
four common and powerful determinative factors, a balancing test
emerges. These factors should be weighed against one another to
address the validity of these regulations.
1. Does the Constitution Grant the Product Special Treatment?
There are few amendments that invoke power over particular
items.191 The First Amendment orders that government may not engage
in “abridging the freedom of speech.”192 By outlawing certain articles,
photos, or other tangible objects, Congress may be in violation of the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has used this premise as an
example in other Commerce Clause cases: “[U]nder the Commerce
Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate
commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by
the First Amendment.”193 Therefore, it is important to recognize which
products the First Amendment protects in order to determine the scope of
Congress’s authority to regulate.
190

Patton, 451 F.3d at 636 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
I will reserve that discussion on the Second Amendment for Section V, where I
will speculate as to how this factor will weigh in determining the constitutionality of the
MFFA. The Thirteenth Amendment is a self-sufficient amendment, in as much as it
permits congressional enforcement of ensuring that any semblance of slavery is not
permitted. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. In the abhorrent event someone attempts to claim a
human being as an intrastate product, the Thirteenth Amendment would defeat any claim
that Congress acted beyond the commerce power. The Twenty First Amendment states,
“[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is hereby prohibited.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. Although the amendment is about
a product, it only becomes a factor when the product enters one state from another,
putting this discussion into the channels category or the instrumentalities, persons, or
things category of Lopez.
192
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
193
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
191
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The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA)
criminalizes the receipt, transportation, and possession of child
pornography.194 Some pre-Raich cases ruled that the CPPA was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce power.195 The
Eleventh Circuit reheard United States v. Maxwell196 on remand from the
Supreme Court and concluded that the Raich decision could serve as an
outline opinion by merely substituting the CPPA for the CSA.197
The Eleventh Circuit also reconsidered the CPPA in United States
v. Smith (Smith II).198 Defendant Alvin Smith was originally found
guilty of violating the CPPA199 for the production and possession of child
pornography.200 Smith’s conviction was overturned on appeal before the
Eleventh Circuit because the interstate commerce nexus was not
considered sufficient to uphold the criminal statute under the Commerce
Clause.201 Yet Smith II, even with the Raich analysis, also addressed a
First Amendment argument.202 Smith took issue with the statutory
construction of the CPPA, specifically the “knowingly” requirement.203
The Eleventh Circuit considered the implications of the defendant’s
knowledge of the age of those depicted in the pornography, as the
material could be constitutionally protected if it involved only adults.204
The court refers to the seminal cases on obscenity and child
pornography, notably New York v. Ferber,205 in which the Supreme
Court determined that the First Amendment did not protect child
pornography.206 In this brief discussion, the Eleventh Circuit invoked a
194

18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006).
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell (Maxwell I), 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004)
(court weighed four factors of Morrison and found the activity as non-economic; to link
between defendant’s possession of child pornography to interstate commerce was
attenuated; that the jurisdictional hook was insufficient; and that the congressional
findings and legislative history were not sufficient to outweigh the other factors). Id. at
1055–67. See also Sarah J. Farley, Comment, Gonzalez v. Raich and the Federal Child
Pornography Statutes: Balancing the Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty, 2 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 621 (2006).
196
446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
197
Id. at 1216.
198
459 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
199
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(b) (2006).
200
Smith II, 459 F.3d at 1282.
201
Id. at 1282–85.
202
Id. at 1287–89.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1288.
205
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
206
Id. at 764. The Eleventh Circuit quoted Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“As a general rule, pornography can be banned only if obscene, but
under [New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)] pornography showing minors can be
proscribed whether or not the images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller
195
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factor that is not normally considered in most Commerce Clause cases,
nor required in Lopez, Morrison, or Raich. Because a Constitutional
protection of a product is so rare, it is an important factor that has
weighed heavily in courts’ analysis.
2. Is the Regulation a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme?
The second factor federal courts should consider is whether there is
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the product in question. This
factor has been prominent in many cases due to the importance the
Supreme Court gave it in Raich.207 The premise of this inquiry is
somewhat dubious: length and detail in statutory language does not
automatically make a “comprehensive” law.208 “Comprehensive” is
defined as “covering completely or broadly.”209 The use of this word in
the Court’s analysis seems particularly troubling for the purposes of
determining if Congress has overstepped its boundaries. That irony
aside, the subjectivity of the determination is also a cause for confusion.
The Fourth Circuit, in the decision that preceded Morrison, called
VAWA a “comprehensive federal statute.”210
The Supreme Court did not reject, nor even consider, the
comprehensiveness of the statute when declaring VAWA
unconstitutional. As a result of Raich, such analysis is required.211 In
Raich, the Court explained that Congress’s goal of halting drug abuse
and controlling legal and illegal drug traffic was meant to be
accomplished under the CSA, as the CSA created “a closed regulatory
system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or
possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the
CSA.”212

v. California.”) (internal citations omitted) (alterations added). See also, United States v.
Smith (Smith II), 459 F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2006).
207
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005). (“[T]he CSA . . . was a lengthy and
detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the production,
distribution, and possession of five classes of ‘controlled substances.’”).
208
Christopher Beam, Paper Weight: The Health Care Bill is More Than 1,000
Pages. Is That a Lot?, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2009, 6:12 PM) http://www.slate.com/id/2225820
(noting that there are other reasons a law may be lengthy. “Increased partisanship over
the years has meant that the minority party is willing to do anything it can to block
legislation—adding amendments, filibustering, or otherwise stalling the lawmaking
process. As a result, the majority party feels the need to pack as much meat into a bill as
it can . . .”).
209
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, (Merriam-Webster Online 2010).
210
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 962–63 (4th
Cir. 1997).
211
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22–25.
212
Id. at 13 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 844(a) (2006)).
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The importance of defining and identifying a comprehensive
regulatory scheme cannot be overstated. Prior to Raich, jurisdictional
hooks served the purpose of tying a federal regulation into interstate
commerce in order to defend the constitutionality of the commerce
power exercised.213 Following Lopez and Morrison, the jurisdictional
hook was an important tool to find not only a nexus to interstate
commerce, but also to limit the power of Congress by restricting the
regulation only to those activities that are actually part of interstate
commerce.214 But the result of Maxwell II215 is a prime example of how
Raich’s comprehensive regulatory scheme framework has altered the
landscape.
The Eleventh Circuit determined that jurisdictional
sufficiency could be ignored when an activity falls under Raich.216 With
jurisdictional hooks no longer playing a part in Commerce Clause
decisions, the comprehensive regulatory scheme is the most concrete
limitation that came out of Raich.
The circuit courts have taken up the comprehensive regulatory
scheme factor as part of their consideration in a number of Commerce
Clause cases. The Tenth Circuit reviewed this factor in Patton and found
that Raich placed the CSA into the third category of Lopez because it
presented a comprehensive regulatory scheme.217 The court’s discussion
on the comprehensive regulatory scheme revolved around the effect that
mere possession of a product has on the marketplace.218 The Patton
court noted that Congress had not opted to make the manufacture,
distribution, sale, possession, or use of the product, body armor, illegal,
but instead only targeted possession for a specific group.219 This was not
a proper use of the commerce power to regulate a market.220 The Tenth
Circuit set a limit that regulation of a product that is not comprehensive
is not sufficient to bring the regulation within the commerce power, as

213

Stuckey, supra note 69, at 2105.
Id. at 2111–12.
215
446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
216
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2006); United States v. Maxwell (Maxwell I), 386
F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (11th Cir. 2004); Stuckey, supra note 69, at 2118–19. In Maxwell I,
the Eleventh Circuit overturned the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A for possessing a
disk that included child pornography. 386 F.3d at 1052–70. The jurisdictional hook of
the statute was that the physical item that contained the child pornography had to be
“mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or . . . produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer.”
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
217
United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006).
218
Id. at 626–27.
219
Id. at 627.
220
Id.
214
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even the federal regulation in Lopez was not enough to uphold the
GFSZA.
In 2006, following Raich, the Ninth Circuit reheard United States v.
Stewart (Stewart II)221 and made significant changes in its analysis as to
what constituted a regulatory scheme. Stewart was in possession of five
homemade machineguns which he constructed from unique and legal
parts.222 In Stewart I, the focus on the federal regulation for possession
of a machinegun, in violation of the GCA,223 relied on the economic and
commercial nature of the regulation, defined by both the actual text of
the statute as well as the congressional findings.224 The focus shifted in
Stewart II because of Raich’s specific articulation of the role that the
regulatory scheme must play in a Commerce Clause analysis.225 The
court compared the CSA to the GCA, finding that both set different
controls based on the uses of each class of drugs or firearms,
respectively.226 The Stewart II court found that Raich allows Congress to
ban the possession of a product where there is a comprehensive
regulation and a rational basis for believing the product will affect the
interstate market of that product.227 Congress is granted deference for all
instances where a comprehensive regulatory scheme is in place.228
3. Is the Product a Fungible Commodity?
Determining whether a product is fungible,229 a commodity,230 or a
fungible commodity is key to the analysis of whether Congress had
sufficient commerce power to regulate a certain area. The importance of
this determination is grounded in the Court’s reliance in Raich on this
point to distinguish the product at issue from those items in Lopez and
Morrison and to connect it to precedent set in Wickard. The Supreme
221

451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Stewart (Stewart I), 348 F.3d 1132, 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).
223
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006).
224
Stewart I, 348 F.3d at 1137–40 (“Nothing in the legislative history suggests that
Congress ever considered the impact of purely intrastate possession of homemade
machineguns on interstate commerce, and there is no reason to assume that prohibiting
local possession of machineguns would have the same national and commercial
consequences as prohibiting the interstate and foreign traffic in firearms.”).
225
Stewart II, 451 F.3d at 1076–77.
226
Id. at 1076.
227
Id. at 1076–77.
228
Id. at 1077.
229
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, (Merriam-Webster Online 2010)
(defining “fungible” as “being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced
by another equal part or quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation; interchangeable.”).
230
See id. (defining “commodity” as “an economic good: as a : a product of
agriculture or mining b : an article of commerce especially when delivered for
shipment . . . c : a mass-produced unspecialized product . . .”).
222
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Court found Wickard and Raich had “striking” similarities; notably, both
cases involved the “cultivating for home consumption, a fungible
commodity, for which there is an established . . . interstate market.”231
Both statutes, the AAA in Wickard and the CSA in Raich, had the goal of
controlling the supply and demand of a fungible commodity on that
market.232 The Raich court noted that “Congress’[s] power to regulate
commerce includes the power to prohibit commerce in a particular
commodity.”233 The CSA, in listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug,
prohibits marijuana entirely.234 The Court held that homegrown
marijuana intended for medical use is indistinguishable from other
marijuana, and therefore, it may enter into the nationwide illegal market,
which would frustrate the purpose of the comprehensive regulation.235
The Court relied on the characterization of marijuana as a commodity in
order to label the “activity” of Raich economic and thereby within
Congress’s commerce power.236 It follows that despite my qualm with
the characterization of a “fungible commodity” as an “activity,” this
factor in the balancing test must stay true to the decision in Raich by
allowing congressional regulation when the product in question is
fungible and/or a commodity. “But at some level, everything is unique;
fungibility is a matter of degree.”237
The Raich decision altered not only the Ninth Circuit’s standards of
what constituted a comprehensive regulatory scheme, as described supra,
but also the court’s concept of commodity. In Stewart I, the Ninth
Circuit contrasted Stewart’s homemade machineguns with wheat.238
Wheat was a “staple commodity” that Fillburn would have otherwise
purchased had he not grown it, whereas Stewart would likely not have
purchased a machinegun if he had not constructed his own.239 Stewart II
reached a different conclusion, basing the definition of commodity on the
existence of a nationwide market for the product, even if that particular
item did not travel in interstate commerce.240
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Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (emphasis added).
Id. at 19.
233
Id. at 19 n.29 (emphasis added).
234
See id. at 14 (characterizing it as a drug with high potential for abuse, without
legitimate medical use, and a lack of acceptable safety for use).
235
Id. at 22, 40–41.
236
Id. at 25–26.
237
United States v. Stewart (Stewart II), 451 F.3d 1071, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2006).
238
United States v. Stewart (Stewart I), 348 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003).
239
Id. The court also used the word “commodity” to describe machineguns in a
footnote, but the significance of the term was substantially lower prior to Raich. Id. at
1138 n.3.
240
Stewart II, 451 F.3d at 1077.
232
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The Patton court struggled with the concept of commodity, as it
recognized that Raich used it in the context of “consumption.”241 The
Patton ruling defined “consumption” as the “act of destroying a thing by
using it; the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it.”242 The
court did not rule specifically if body armor is in fact a “fungible
commodity” as Raich would require, but instead dismissed the case
because the statute was not a total prohibition against body armor.243 Yet
it still appears that the court had difficulty in divorcing “consumption”
from “commodity,” so if a product cannot be consumed, it cannot be a
commodity.
The Patton commodity definition clashes with the D.C. Circuit’s
definition in reference to child pornography.244 In United States v.
Sullivan, the D.C. Circuit defined child pornography as a commodity
because the duplication of the product through trading gave it more
economic qualities.245 The court stated that because of the “viral
character” of digital images, even if the original is destroyed, the
subsequent copies many continue to multiply as the commodity is still
traded.246 This peculiar twist on the definition of commodity lends more
support to the idea that these definitions are often twisted to fit the
preferences of the court based on the intrastate product in question.
4. Do Congressional Findings Show a Connection to Interstate
Commerce or Another Reasonable Purpose for Federal Regulation?
Lastly, courts must review congressional findings as to how the
product affects interstate commerce, as well as the other reasons
Congress gives to regulate the product. Particular congressional findings
are not required, nor does the lack of findings do anything to minimize
congressional authority, but they are nonetheless helpful in evaluating
Congress’s intention and to allow courts to judge the interstate nexus.247
The lack of findings was a pitfall of the GFSZA in Lopez,248 and the
Supreme Court rejected the findings in Morrison that attempted to
connect VAWA to interstate commerce.249

241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 625 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. at 627.
United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 889–91 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 891.
Id.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).

258

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:229

Although the jurisdictional hook may no longer be required in the
wake of Raich,250 the Court does provide for one check, albeit broad:
“We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”251 Congress’s
declaration that a regulation affects interstate commerce is not unlike a
jurisdictional hook in that it is not “a talisman that wards off
constitutional challenges.”252 The rational basis test has extended into
most evaluations of Commerce Clause cases.253
In addition to these other factors to evaluate, it remains important
for our basic notion of federalism for courts to at least consider if
Congress is overstepping its powers. This evaluation should be based on
the traditional role of the federal government, and should consider if the
reasoning behind the regulation is superfluous. The motivation behind
the body armor felon-in-possession statute was a reaction to high-profile
police battles with armored criminals.254 Child pornography legislation
is justified with an explanation of the effects that this sexual exploitation
has on the children who are victimized.255
Even the Raich court conceded that congressional findings are not
infallible, as Justice Stevens agrees that marijuana does have a
therapeutic purpose as noted in the Compassionate Use Act, despite
Congress’s classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug that has no
legitimate medical use.256 The Patton court found a similar problem with
the congressional findings that felons who possessed body armor were
dangerous,257 because the court believed wearing body armor is a selfdefense tactic that reduces crime.258
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See Stuckey, supra note 69.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
252
United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th Cir. 2006).
253
See, e.g., United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e give
special deference to any findings Congress may have made regarding the connection of
the statute to interstate commerce . . . .”); United States v. Rose, 522 F.3d 710, 717–19
(6th Cir. 2008) (finding that Congress had a rational basis to believe the intrastate transfer
of firearms would affect the national market).
254
United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing H.R. REP.
107–193, pt. 1, at 2 (2001)).
255
Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–358, title I,
§ 102, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008).
256
545 U.S. at 9.
257
H.R. REP. No. 107–193, pt. 1, at 2 (2001).
258
Patton, 451 F.3d at 629. In this particular case, the defendant wore the body armor
to protect himself from gang violence rather than purchase a firearm to do so. Id.
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V. APPLYING THE FOURTH CATEGORY’S FOUR FACTOR TEST
A. Montana Firearms Would Likely be Exempt from Congressional
Regulation
This analysis will rest on the assumption that the product in
question conforms with all three MFFA requirements: (1) the firearm,
whether handgun or rifle, was manufactured in Montana or another
respective state; (2) the firearm must have the “Made in Montana” stamp
on a large metal portion; and (3) the firearm must not have traveled in
interstate commerce.”
1. Does the Constitution Grant the Product Special Treatment?
The status of firearms as a constitutionally protected product is
nascent. The Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller259
that the Second Amendment recognizes the pre-existing civil right of an
individual to keep and bear arms.260 The Court further stated in
McDonald v. Chicago261 that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms is “among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty.”262
Yet, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.”263 The Court was not clear about what
standard should apply in evaluating federal firearms regulations, only
that the mere “rational basis” scrutiny would not be enough.264 The
review of gun control laws is supposed to be rigorous;265 however, the
degree to which that has been true in the lower courts is mixed. Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, although critical of both Heller and Roe v. Wade,
declared them “two of the most important decisions of the modern
judicial era. They now together cast a long shadow over contemporary
constitutional law.”266 Other analysis, however, has shown that the
practical effect on the lower federal courts has been minimal.267
259

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 592 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”).
261
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
262
Id. at 3023.
263
Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
264
Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the
Heller Paradox, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 206 (2010).
265
Id.
266
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (2009).
267
See Adam Liptak, Few Ripples From Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html.
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Although Justice Scalia stated in a footnote that the current firearms
regulations are “presumptively lawful,” there is nothing in the Heller
opinion that suggests that the current federal gun control laws could
stand absolutely.268 The only regulation directly upheld in Heller was the
one questioned in United States v. Miller269 on short-barreled shotguns.270
Heller distinguishes Miller to apply only to that particular statute.271 A
district court in the Second Circuit was one of the first courts to
recognize that the Second Amendment “creates an individual right to
possess a firearm unrelated to any military purpose, it also establishes a
protectible [sic] liberty interest.”272 Although the Supreme Court has yet
to define what restrictions can properly be placed on firearms possession,
circuit courts would be wise to respect the states that choose to impose
less restrictive means on a recognized civil right.
In MSSA, the court discounted the plaintiffs’ claim at oral argument
that the Second Amendment requires strict scrutiny of the GCA.273 First,
the plaintiffs did not make an appropriate constitutional claim.274 That
notwithstanding, although McDonald has recognized the individual
fundamental right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense, this
does not extend to the right to manufacture and sell firearms.275
2. Is the Regulation a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme?
The GCA is the primary regulation that the MFFA seeks to avoid.
Several rulings have declared the GCA a “comprehensive regulatory
scheme,” even prior to the importance that Raich put on the term.276 This
factor weighs heavily against the MFFA, although it might not apply for
all of the individual restrictions. Some parts of the GCA intend to keep
firearms away from particular classes of people.277 In that regard, the
GCA is comprehensive.278 Through its findings in MSSA, the court made
268

Heller, 554 U.S. 678 n.26.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
270
Id. at 178.
271
Heller, 554 U.S. at 677.
272
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting
the Adam Walsh Amendments that require an accused sex offender to relinquish his
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms before the individual has been convicted
of any crime).
273
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, *50–51 n.15 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
E.g., NRA of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 277 (6th Cir. 1997); San Diego
County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 926 F. Supp. 1415, 1419–20 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
277
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006).
278
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976).
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the comparison between the GCA and the CSA, as the Ninth Circuit did
in Stewart II.279 Yet this is not a universal application.
Another issue with analyzing many aspects of the GCA, including
the felon-in-possession provisions, is that the relevant cases were decided
in the 1970s, resulting in few being subject to reexamination. There is
also the issue of whether the entire market for firearms should be
regulated, as opposed to only specific instances. A strong argument can
be made that only statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), banning
machineguns entirely, constitute a comprehensive regulation of the
market. This would bring machineguns in line with marijuana. In order
to fully understand the effect the articulation of the fourth category of the
commerce power in relation to the GCA, each individual provision, and
its aims would have to be considered separately.
3. Is the Product a Fungible Commodity?
The MFFA attempts to cure the problem of fungibility by
mandating that all firearms include a “Made in Montana” stamp on a
“central metallic part.”280 There is no such provision for the accessories
or ammunition, however. Regardless of the markings, there has been
uncertainty by courts and scholars regarding whether firearms are
fungible. The Fifth Circuit, in the lower court case for Lopez,
determined that, “firearms do not have the fungible and untraceable
characteristics of narcotics,” a prescient comparison.281 Other courts and
commentators have sparred over determining the fungibility of
firearms.282
Perhaps a reason for this confusion is that fungibility also varies
from the viewpoint of the observer and the purpose of the user. That is
to say that some guns are better suited for crimes than others, but even
so, the criminal could just as easily find another gun to fit her needs to
commit a crime.283 With this ambiguity, and keeping in mind the
279

Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, *52–55 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
280
Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-106 (2010).
281
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 n.51 (5th Cir. 1993).
282
Compare Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066–67 (N.Y.
2001), with Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture
Series: A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2337 (2003) (“Guns that
are sold legally often wind up in illegal hands. Their fungibility, their portability, their
small size, and their widespread availability makes them an alternative black-market
global currency for transnational terrorists. Small arms can be bartered for food,
livestock, smuggled money, even diamonds.”).
283
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related
Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms
Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 43 (2000) (“[P]laintiffs often distinguish certain models of
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warning that “fungibility is a matter of degree,”284 it would only favor the
constitutionality of the MFFA by having additional markings that would
make the firearm distinguishable. Randy Barnett, the counsel for Raich,
speculated that the MFFA may need to require more markings as one
way of assuring the federal government that the intrastate products can
be distinguished on the national market.285 In MSSA, the court quoted
Raich and called firearms “commodities for which there is an
established, lucrative interstate market”286 but did not consider the actual
definition of “commodity.” Courts continue to incorrectly label any
object a “commodity” in order to fit it into the flawed Lopez framework,
which likewise incorrectly equates “product” with “activity.”
4. Do Congressional Findings Show a Connection to Interstate
Commerce or Another Reasonable Purpose for Federal Regulation?
Finally, the congressional findings will vary depending on the exact
statute in question. Congress can say whatever it wants to in the way of
congressional findings. Lopez is an example where congressional
findings could not save a federal gun regulation.287 In the Fifth Circuit
case of Lopez, the court rejected the government’s theory, harshly
criticizing it: “If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of
such a nexus to the grounds of any public or private school, and can do
so without supportive findings or legislative history, on the theory that
education affects commerce, then it could also similarly ban lead pencils,
‘sneakers,’ Game Boys, or slide rules.”288 Though the Fifth Circuit
would not speak to the potential approval with modified findings,289 the
government did not rely on the findings of § 922(q) as they existed when

guns as especially well suited for crime when describing what makes certain marketing
practices negligent . . . . On the other hand, defendant-manufacturers have argued that
the marketing of a particular gun is not a substantial factor in causing a crime-related
injury, even where the crime gun is successfully traced, since countless other guns are
available and would have served the criminal just as well.”).
284
United States v. Stewart (Stewart II), 451 F.3d 1071, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2006).
285
Glenn Beck: Interview with Randy Barnett, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
(Fox News Channel television broadcast May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lL_AmV6VlBA (“I don’t think [marking the firearm
only once] is going to be good enough. I think all the parts, or many of the parts, have to
be marked . . . .”).
286
Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, *53 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010) (quoting United States v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32 (2005)).
287
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995).
288
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993).
289
Id. at 1368.
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presented to the Supreme Court, nor the amended version that stands in
the current statute.290
Congressional findings that are appropriate for this evaluation come
in many forms. Findings that show a nexus between the regulation of a
product at issue and interstate commerce may be difficult to uphold, as
these are mostly criminal laws that are traditionally left to the states.
Other findings that intend to regulate a specific firearm or accessory,
including machineguns or body armor, will vary based on the end goal of
the statute. Under § 922(o), machineguns are banned entirely, and
therefore, the congressional findings that explain the merits of the
elimination of this product’s market will help weigh in favor of a court
permitting the regulation.291 On the other hand, § 931 bans body armor
for felons, and congressional findings made pursuant to this statute elude
only to the danger of felons specifically possessing body armor, but
make no comment about the national market.292 In this case, because
there is not an absolute ban on firearms, the government would not be
able to make a strong argument on those grounds. The federal
government’s argument would have to be tailored to issues regarding the
regulation of the national market, which creates complications as
explained supra.
5. The Factors Weigh In Favor of Upholding the MFFA
Thanks to the Heller and McDonald decisions, firearms are in a
unique position, as they are one of a handful of products that have special
Constitutional protections.293 Although gun laws are lengthy and many
courts have considered the GCA to be a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, it is not as comprehensive when considered on a statute-bystatute basis, or perhaps more appropriately, on a product-by-product
basis. We will only learn which federal gun control regulations will
prevail when the federal government enforces these statutes against an
individual who is adhering to his states’ firearms freedom act. The
MFFA is explicit in its attempt to eliminate the issue of fungibility by
using markings, a unique solution to a difficult problem. Accordingly,
congressional findings in this area will come under greater scrutiny, and
again, will vary based on the specific regulation. In this environment,
the MFFA will likely succeed.

290
291
292
293

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63.
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006).
Id. at § 931.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591–94 (2008).
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B. The Application of the Products Category’s Balancing Test Still
Upholds Federal Regulations on Intrastate Child Pornography and
Marijuana
Testing the fourth category with precedent demonstrates that it
does, in fact, already exist. The regulation of child pornography and
marijuana, would still be permitted. Although no court has explicitly
laid out these factors in determining the constitutionality of such
restrictions, application of the balancing test leaves these decisions on
firmer ground.
1. Child Pornography
Child pornography cases have borne out significant legislation
recently in many different aspects of the law, but the end result has been
consistent: federal law outlaws intrastate child pornography. These
cases have been particularly useful in finding the threads that connect to
create the fourth category. First, there is no constitutional protection of
child pornography under the First Amendment, so this prong weighs in
favor of Congress. Such speech has been used by the Supreme Court as
an example of a type “fully outside the protection of the First
Amendment.”294
Second, child pornography regulations have often been found to be
comprehensive. The CPPA has been called comprehensive by the
Sixth,295 Seventh,296 Ninth,297 Tenth,298 Eleventh,299 and the District of
Columbia Circuits.300 District courts in other circuits have relied on
some of these decisions and quoted their analyses on the
comprehensiveness of the CPPA.301 Although there are several courts
that have not opted to bestow the CPPA with the “comprehensive”
distinction, the courts have still upheld its constitutionality.302 In many
294

United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); See also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
295
United States v. Gann, 160 F. App’x. 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2005).
296
United States v. Blum, 534 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2008).
297
United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2008).
298
United States v. Croxford, 170 F. App’x. 31, 41 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1269–72 (10th Cir. 2005).
299
United States v. Maxwell (Maxwell II), 446 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2006).
300
United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
301
E.g., United States v. Keller, No. 2:09-CR-20113, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71688,
at *14–18 (D. Mich. June 30, 2009) (quoting United States v. Blum, 534 F.3d 608 (7th
Cir. 2008)); United States v. McGee, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3743, at *12–14 (D. Miss.
2007) (quoting United States v. Maxwell (Maxwell II), 446 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir.
2006)).
302
See, e.g., United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that the
“general regulatory scheme” compared to Raich); United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208,
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instances, the analysis noted the importance of the suppression of the
entire market of child pornography.303 The CPPA explains that its
purpose is to “eliminate the market for the sexual exploitative use of
children” by “prohibiting the possession and viewing of child
pornography.”304 This leaves no exceptions to the rule and focuses the
regulation on the product itself.
Third, the fungibility of child pornography has been analyzed in
federal courts. Some courts have deemed that child pornography is a
fungible commodity and have not differentiated it from the wheat in
Wickard or the marijuana in Raich.305 The D.C. Circuit considered child
pornography to have even greater commodity characteristics because
sharing child pornography actually increases the supply.306 The
consumption of the product actually creates more of it, rather than
diminishing it.307 The court additionally recognized the fungibility of
child pornography and how it could be diverted from intrastate into
interstate markets.308 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in a pre-Raich
case, held that a single photo of a mother and her daughter partially
undressed was not fungible because the mother had no intention of
exchanging it for more child pornography or for any other economic
reasons.309
Fourth, there are significant congressional findings for the
regulation of child pornography. It focuses primarily on the serious
long-term effects that sexual exploitation has on children, a protected

214 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit did not reexamine United States v. Morales–De
Jesus, 372 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004) decided prior to Raich decision. Morales-De Jesus only
noted a “comprehensive backdrop” as to congressional findings. Id. at 12. See also,
United States v. Cramer, 213 F. App’x. 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit did
not review the decision in United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), that the
CPAA is constitutional on Commerce Clause grounds.
303
See, e.g., Forrest, 429 F.3d at 78–79.
304
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006).
305
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We
find very little to distinguish constitutionally Maxwell’s claim from Raich’s. Indeed,
much of the Court’s analysis could serve as an opinion in this case by simply replacing
marijuana and the CSA with child pornography and the CPPA.”).
306
United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 889–91 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“In contrast to
wheat or marijuana, the supply of electronic images of child pornography has a viral
character: every time one user downloads an image, he simultaneously produces a
duplicate version of that image. Transfers of wheat or marijuana merely subdivide an
existing cache; transfers of digital pornography, on the other hand, multiply the existing
supply of the commodity, so that even if the initial possessor’s holdings are destroyed,
subsequent possessors may further propagate the images.”).
307
Id.
308
Id. at 891.
309
See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
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class in our society.310 Child pornography that is intrastate could be
ensnared by congressional regulations under the fourth category.
2. Marijuana
Although one could simply take Raich to declare federal drug
regulations such as the CSA constitutional, the balancing test of the
fourth category bares out the same conclusion. First, there is no right to
marijuana under any amendment to the Constitution. Second, Raich sets
the standard in explaining the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the
CSA.311 Justice Stevens devotes considerable ink to describing the
history of the CSA and why it is a prime example of this ideal regulatory
scheme.312 Third, the fungibility of marijuana, like wheat in Wickard, is
without question.313 Raich clearly outlined this characteristic, which is
what makes it such an important factor in the current jurisprudence.
Likewise, the fourth and final category, congressional findings, were
found to be sufficient in Raich.314 With all four factors on their side,
Congress would still be justified in regulating intrastate marijuana.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the outcome in Montana’s federal case, the MFFA
and related challenges are not going away. Criticism of Congress’s
heavy regulatory hand has come in large part from the actions it has
taken with its Commerce Clause power. The authority that courts vested
in Congress in the last century, despite a brief turnaround, continues to
dominate the federal landscape.
Lopez, Morrison, Raich, and
Scarborough are four cases that cannot peaceably coexist within the
current three-category framework if we are to consider consistency in the
circuit courts and restraint of the national government as part of our legal
system. Lopez gave us what it intended to be three all-inclusive
categories, but it falls short. A fourth category has emerged in scattered
strands in various cases in the federal circuit courts, but no court has
been willing or able to pull them all together. Now, Montana and other
states are using the MFFA to fire a shot directly at the courts, urging
them to stop talking and to take action.315 A fourth category exclusively
310

Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–358, § 102,
122 Stat. 4001 (2008).
311
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–24 (2005).
312
Id. at 10–15.
313
Id. at 18–22, 22.
314
Id. at 12, 20–21.
315
Recall that the Tenth Circuit neglected to settle the problems it saw with
Scarborough and the three Lopez categories. United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 636

2010]

FOUR SHOTS AT THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

267

for intrastate products will bring together all of the Commerce Clause
cases that are currently in great tension with one another. When courts
are upfront that the product itself is actually what is evaluated,
Commerce Clause jurisprudence will no longer be an easy target for
criticism.

(10th Cir. 2006) (“Any doctrinal inconsistency between Scarborough and the Supreme
Court’s more recent decisions is not for this Court to remedy.”).

